23rd February
The Senkaku worries rumble on, like an upset stomach being fed cabbage water and pale ale, with somewhat alarmist scenario writers tempered by the moderating views of pacific sages: we are either on the verge of Asian/world war, or else these are mere teething pains with babies fighting over the comforter. Here are three examples, not terribly deep or striking, from each camp, and from the same publication:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true
http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/22/6-ways-to-prevent-a-conflict-between-tokyo-and-beijing/?all=true
http://thediplomat.com/china-power/a-frightening-prospect-war-in-the-east-china-sea/
The Economist attempts to be more balanced and insightful, and basically does a decent job, but in being balanced it and several other publications somewhat miss the salient points of recent developments. The islands are Japanese, have been since modern records began, and their status cannot be traced to the expansionist nature of Imperial Japan (unlike Takeshima/Dokdo), nor to the murky end of the Second World War (which hasn’t ended between Japan and Russia, and hence the continuing dispute over four northern islands off Hokkaido). They are Japanese, and China was fairly happy to accept that until the 1990s. While Abe’s nationalism is unhelpful and undignified, it did not create or provoke this current situation, although Ishihara’s purchase attempt acted as a catalyst by impelling Japanese government action and raising the stakes. PM Noda did not create the problem, he dealt with a poor situation in the way he considered most appropriate, and there were certainly few alternatives available to him.
This crisis is due to increased Chinese nationalism, both organically occurring within a society freed from (only) some of the bounds of state censorship, and state sponsored though education policies and more direct Chinese Communist Party activity. This is not to reject the notion that most Chinese would like the islands to be Chinese, maybe they do, but that the issue has only really arisen in recent years due to state sponsorship of the issue. A number of China experts have also pointed out that those most active in island ‘reclamation’ movement are of the age groups that is of the early 30s-early 40s, when state nationalist education had its first flowering in the ‘freer’ society, with few advocates before or after this narrow age range and seam of national fervour.
Abe’s nationalism is rather muted in contrast to that of China, although the Ministry of Education’s efforts to include Japan-centric positions on the territorial disputes to the exclusion of all other views are savoury sweet meat to Japan’s neighbours and critics. Japan has continued to remind neighbours and the wider world of the other two territorial issues that it has to deal with but with little fervour, although in recent years Korea, and to a lesser degree Russia, have played the nationalist card to drum up domestic political support on these issues. Russia has attempted negotiation at stages, mainly in the 1990s, while Korea has strongly rejected Japanese claims to Takeshima, and it is the RoK which has the longest track-record of sustained, intense nationalism on such a territorial issue. Perhaps as the often invaded, recently colonised country trapped between two greater powers and a hostile cousin this position is understandable, however unpleasant nationalism tends to be as national policy. Waving a flag at the Olympics with one’s family and friends has a completely different value to teachers waving flags in front of schoolchildren in their classrooms.
The one change under Abe has been to send a representative to Shimane Prefecture’s ‘Takeshima Day’ event on 22nd February with many Asian media represented at the ceremony, but one Korean gentleman ejected, apparently for attempting to hand out fliers saying there are various viewpoints on the sovereignty issue, so dialogue is required. By such actions, the organisers of such events show themselves to be people of feebly narrow minds and terminally limited respect for the views of others, and not only ill-equipped to find a peaceful solution to such a problem but simply ignorant of the need to even search for one. Abe backed away from full official recognition of the event, despite his electoral bluster in December, but his reasoning was based upon ‘make one enemy of your neighbours at a time’ rather than on a truly fraternal view of the democracy on the Korean peninsula.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130222_29.html
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130222_31.html
http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2013022200738
Meanwhile, as the Shimane folk were banging their gongs and demanding their islands back, like their younger equivalents in China, an ex-PM, Mori Yoshiro, was in Moscow dispensing his wisdom and doing his bit to reduce tension and possible engineer the beginnings of a settlement to the island dispute with Russia. That Mori is the man to do this may seem rather odd, for he is a proto-nationalist of the LDP, the man who claimed Japan was a ‘sacred country’ in language perfectly suited to the late 1930s militarists extolling the virtues of Japanese rule in China, but the LDP has many such oddballs. Suzuki Muneo, unique among ex-LDP bigwigs in having had an underground Japanese rap group sample his conversational punch-line for a dance track chorus (“Ya-ya-Yabbai-yo, Yabbai-yo!”), had a 19 year career in the LDP during which time he became a self-professed “expert” on Russia. He did everything he could to promote Japan-Russian relations, to the extent that he essentially attempted to displace the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to bully the Ministry’s personnel into acting as his de facto support staff, and had funds allocated to projects that he controlled, named (after himself), and with seemingly limitless power to act in his Hokkaido domain. That his brief but scorching flight came to an inglorious end was not surprising. He was found guilty of accepting bribes (his assistant went to gaol for soliciting those bribes), not declaring the income, and perjury, spent a year in prison, BUT is still in politics, still a Diet member, and still claiming to be an expert on Russian affairs despite having been a proven liar in court. With such great people on the case is it any wonder that there is no peace treaty between Japan and Russia, and the island issue drags on, with the former island inhabitants dying off and their descendants left with few champions other than the Muneo-like charlatans of the fringe?
In fairness to Mori, he made the sensible case (often rejected by the former inhabitants and the government) that Russia might offer to return two islands (as they had previously), and Japan should accept this offer as the best case of an amicable settlement whereby both countries win. Despite his obvious limitations, Mori appears to be sincere in his efforts. If only there were such statements being made on other territorial disputes.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130223_01.html
In the flare up over the Senkaku islands it is easy to forget that Japan has several major domestic problems outstanding. The issue of ‘Abenomics’, attempting to end deflation, lower the yen, and boost consumption and growth are all very nice, and many seem to support the effects if not the prescribed means to achieve them. However, there are some rather obvious and troublesome results. Japan has outsourced a great deal of manufacturing over the past two decades, as the yen has risen (and then fallen), and while Made in Japan is still a measure of quality and excellence these days it is far more likely to be Assembled in Japan, with many components in Japan manufactured products being sourced from China, Korea, and South-East Asia. The dropping yen, down from highs of less than 80yen to the dollar six months ago to 94-95yen recently, has pushed up import prices of such components, as well as energy costs.
The irony of the latter point is that now Japan’s atomic power company is selling uranium to reduce debts. Since only one nuclear power plant is in operation, and many other are not only offline but several are facing complete scrapping there is so little demand for the product that the raw material provides that the company’s debt is being reduced by selling the fuel. And things are about to get worse, as several studies have indicated that a number of plants built in the heyday of atomic positivism were rather rushed through with limited consideration for the law or safety. Indeed, who would have thought such a thing possible (in a country composed of volcanic fault lines with a seemingly endemically corrupt politico-industry-academic community combine), but it seems that several plants are sited over active fault lines (illegal), although the definition of active is ‘having been the subject of movement in the past 135,000years’, which for some LDP backbenchers may not be the case. In the worst case an entire nuclear plant will probably have to be scrapped, due to being built on a fault line, and yet Japan has no policy, technology, or location for processing such a reactor and making it safe.
With the second anniversary of the 3.11 triple crisis approaching it may seem staggering that so little has been done to work out some of these major nuclear problems, but they are vast and have extreme long term consequences. The failure to begin significant rebuilding work in Tohoku almost two years on is almost reaching the point of national shame, yet the news is full of Abenomics, Senkaku islands, Chinese radar, and the upcoming summer elections by which the LDP can probably control both houses with huge majorities and set forth with their plan to rewrite the constitution and Japan’s image in the world. Rewriting seems to have been prioritized over rebuilding, and in a sense that equates to creating a new identity for Japan. Whether it is the form of identity Japanese would wish to see as the legacy of the Heisei period is dubious.
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